Recreational activity like billiard or snooker are not prohibited by any law, nor are the said games immoral, or fall within the protected sphere as envisaged by Section 133 of the Code; powers under Chapter X of Cr.P.C are special powers to be exercised as a temporary measure, and not to be used to indefinitely shut down businesses. 2025 LHC 7168
In the present lis, the petitioner was operating and running his business of the snooker club and was providing the service to the general public to play the games of billiards and snooker against the payment of the requisite charges fixed for the said games, which games are a recreational activity, and the same are not prohibited by any law, nor are the said games immoral, or fall within the protected sphere as envisaged by Section 133 of the Code. The powers under Chapter X of the Code are special powers insofar as they are only to be exercised as a temporary measure in circumstances causing glaring public nuisance and there is imminent danger or threat to public peace and tranquility. The said powers cannot be, at any junction, be used to indefinitely, shut down a business which is being operated within the sphere of the law, based on vague complaints and allegations. Even otherwise, the prohibition order under chapter X of the Code is to be narrowly tailored so that the same may not infringe the economic rights of any individual without the due process of the law. In this regard, the entire material available on record was perused and it appears that no proof is available to substantiate the factum of public nuisance so as to justify the drastic actions taken against the petitioner. No iota of evidence is available which discloses that the prohibition of business of the petitioner was necessitated by a situation of emergency, thereby prompted the learned Magistrate to passed the impugned judgement and placing a blanket ban on the business of the petitioner.3 In absence of such material, both the impugned judgements are arbitrary, capricious, and amount to abuse of process of law, thereby warrant being set aside in this Court‟s inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice. Further, under the same chapter of the Code, the prohibition orders could have been passed to direct the petitioner to adhere to specific operating hours or to regulate noise, as opposed to passing a blanket ban on his business.