It follows from the above that in view of statutory principle enshrined in Section 10 of the Ordinance, where dower is only described as „deferred‟ in the Nikahnama without an express stipulation that it would be payable on death or divorce or any specific time or happening of any particular future event, the same shall be payable on demand. In other words, where the dower is expressly designated as „deferred‟ and the parties have stipulated a specific time or triggering event, it falls due at that point of time or upon the occurrence of that event while where the dower is designated as „deferred‟ but no time limit or event is specified, it becomes payable upon demand and wife shall not have to wait for dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce.

In the present case, nothing has been pointed out from the Nikahnama showing that payment of the deferred dower was specifically restricted or linked to the occurrence of divorce or death. Hence, the Petitioner cannot be deprived of her lawful right to claim the same merely on the ground that the marriage between the parties still subsists. Thus, it is evident that Family Court had correctly appreciated the evidence on record and correctly applied the law while decreeing suit of the Petitioner for recovery of dower, whereas, the Appellate Court misapplied the law in reversing the said finding of the Family Court.